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Abstract
Building on corporate governance research and responsible leadership theory this paper
examines, through a multiple case approach, three major cases of corporate failures in the
emerging economies of Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, member states of the
Caribbean Community trade bloc. The paper accordingly provides valuable insights into the
dynamics of corporate governance in the Caribbean and proposes a responsible leadership
approach as a framework to mitigating agency-problems and addressing the changing
business contexts of the region. The paper suggests that researchers and practitioners need to
develop a more holistic approach towards understanding corporate governance by going
beyond traditional governance mechanisms and controls, and incorporating responsible
leadership levels of analysis into the equation. It also establishes that regulators, boards,
management, and auditors are critical to avoiding corporate failures and that good corporate
governance is fundamental to the performance and sustainability of firms and economies as a
whole.

Introduction
The importance of corporate governance has been globally recognized evident by the
emergence of international standards and responses to the corporate governance debate from
all regions of the world. The enactment of new legislation and corporate governance codes and
regulations in some countries are also indicative of its increasing importance. Examples of
these responses include the development of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance;
the Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance (CACG) Guidelines for Corporate
Governance, and the United States’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. These measures were not
only a response to myriad corporate scandals, but also the result of the appeal from
international institutional investors who demanded improved corporate governance in
corporations and countries as a condition to invest. The more recent global financial crisis of

2008 as a result of the collapse of many banks and financial institutions further propelled
corporate governance on the agenda of all major economies (Crane & Matten, 2010).
Understandably, achieving good corporate governance became a central theme in most of the
governance related discussions and initiatives in these economies. Despite this growing global
corporate governance movement, the Caribbean region’s response has however been very
limited notwithstanding its own corporate governance challenges.1
This article therefore examines the major corporate governance crises in three of the major
member countries of CARICOM − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, respectively.
In each of the cases, failure is attributed primarily to poor internal and external corporate
governance practices and have raised questions concerning the roles of regulators, boards,
executives, and auditors. The importance of good corporate governance practices for ensuring
firm performance and sustainability as well as economic stability is also strongly established.
The paper provides valuable insights into the dynamics of corporate governance in the
Caribbean and proposes a responsible leadership approach as a framework to mitigating
agency problems and addressing the changing business contexts of the region. It suggests that
researchers and practitioners need to develop a more holistic approach towards understanding
corporate governance by going beyond traditional governance mechanisms and controls, and
incorporating responsible leadership levels of analysis into the equation. The article is
organized as follows: the first section gives an overview of corporate governance while the
second examines the corporate governance landscape of the Caribbean. The third outlines the
methodological approach employed in the study, and examines the three cases in detail. An
analysis of the commonalities in these cases together with a proposed approach to achieving
good governance in the Caribbean is discussed in the fourth section. In general, the paper
contributes to corporate governance research in emerging markets and applies the theory of
responsible leadership (RL) within the context of corporate governance.

Overview of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance, at its most basic level, establishes the rules to deal with issues related
to the separation of ownership and control and so defines the framework in which
relationships between a company’s management, its board of directors, its shareholders, and
other stakeholders interact (CIPE, 2008). For shareholders, corporate governance can provide
increased confidence of an equitable return on their investment; while for stakeholders, it can
provide an assurance that the organization manages its impact on the environment and
society in a responsible manner (Maier, 2005). Corporate governance also encompasses the
combination of laws, regulations, listing rules, and voluntary private sector practices that
enable the company to attract capital, perform efficiently, generate profit, and meet other
legal obligations and general societal expectations (Maier, 2005). It is pertinent to note,
however, that there is no universally- accepted definition of corporate governance. This is
partly attributable to context specificity, emphasis on different aspects by different
“Caribbean” is this article refers to the 15 emerging economies that are part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
established in 1973 to promote economic integration and cooperation as well as to ensure that the benefits of integration are
equitably shared. The 15 Member States are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad
and Tobago. The population of CARICOM is just over 16 million and predominantly English-speaking.
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professional groups, and theoretical perspectives. Nonetheless, governance is relevant to the
performance of both private and public sector organizations, and many of the principles and
concepts of governance are applicable to both sectors (Uhrig, 2003).
It has been established that companies can derive various benefits by practicing good
corporate governance. A well-governed entity will be more efficient and more likely to produce
effective outcomes. Good corporate governance improves access to capital and financial
markets and attracts greater investment as well as it strengthens management by shaping a
sound company strategy that will generate better profit margins. Empirical research has
revealed that over 84 percent of global institutional investors are willing to pay a premium for
the shares of a well-governed company over one with a comparable financial record, but that is
poorly governed (CIPE, 2005). In addition, good corporate governance minimizes the incidence
of corruption and improves the management of risks (Tricker, 2012). It also helps prevent
systemic banking crises even in countries where most firms are not actively traded on stock
exchanges (CIPE, 2005) as is the case of the Caribbean region. Good corporate governance also
involves companies taking into serious consideration their environmental and social footprints
by being responsible corporate citizens (OECD, 2004).
Unlike developed economies where the link between good corporate governance and publiclytraded shares are obvious, in emerging markets, such as the Caribbean, there is a tendency to
overlook its importance. This is largely due to the limited role of the stock market for raising
capital and the widespread dominance of smaller firms that do not have listed shares in
addition to large family-owned, state-owned, and/or foreign-owned companies whose shares
are also not widely traded locally (Oman, Fries, & Buiter, 2003). Yet given the highly
interconnected economies that exist and the opportunities that emerging markets provide for
investors, corporate governance in such regions cannot continue to be ignored. Further to
facilitate a sustained development of these economies, good corporate governance is
fundamental.
There are a number of principles as well as structural and behavioral factors that are presented
in the literature as ideals for good corporate governance. The question of what constitutes
good corporate governance, however, is not as important or as relevant as the question of
whether or not governance is present and whether it is the most appropriate form for the
particular entity (Uhrig, 2003). This is why it is easier to identify the lack of governance through
failure than the presence of sound governance mechanisms and structures through success.
Good corporate governance, nevertheless, is commonly presented as entailing the following
characteristics: (a) Shareholders elect directors who represent them; (b) Directors vote on key
matters and adopt the majority decision; (c) Decisions are made in a transparent manner so
that shareholders and others can hold directors accountable; (d) The entity adopts accounting
standards to generate the information necessary for directors, investors, and other
stakeholders to make decisions; and (e) The organization’s policies and practices adhere to
applicable local laws (CIPE, 2008).
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The Corporate Governance Landscape of the Caribbean
As mentioned earlier, the CARICOM community is comprised of 15 emerging economies where
organized markets are nascent and credible governance structures have historically been
limited (ECCB, 2003). In each Caribbean state, there are several pieces of legislation designed
to enforce order, discipline, regulate businesses, protect the public, and enhance transparency,
disclosure, and accountability to ensure an efficiently functioning economy. But due to the
individuality of circumstances in each member state, there are disparities within the regulatory
system ranging from penalties for offences, effectiveness, and interpretation. These disparities
could make doing business difficult, as well as unintentionally allow inadequate controls for
regulating a company’s behavior and so pose greater risks to the region’s financial stability
(CTIR, 2005).
Developments in the area of corporate governance in the Caribbean have been limited to the
financial sector. These were largely a result of the financial crisis in Latin America, Asia, and
Russia that led to an increase in global sensitivity to risks in the international financial markets
(ECCB, 2003). In addition, concerns with respect to money laundering and terrorist financing
have also triggered pressure for governance related developments in the region. These drove
Central Banks to improve levels of supervision and regulation of financial institutions and the
adoption of international standards. Nevertheless, within the non-financial sectors adoption of
good corporate governance measures has been inadequate. This is because corporate
governance is generally considered in the context of promoting investor protection, but less
than one percent of the Caribbean population could be deemed as being an active investor
(ECCB, 2003:10). Thus corporate governance has not played an important role in regional
corporations on account of the lack of institutional-and-retail-investor participation (ECCB,
2003). Moreover, before the CLICO/CFL fiasco of 2009, the Caribbean did not experience the
types of crises and losses of investors’/depositors’ funds that have occurred in other regions.
This, in itself, served to retard the pace in which corporate governance has developed in the
region.
On a whole, as a region, the Caribbean faces some inherent corporate governance problems
and peculiarities based on the small size of its countries and economies as outlined in Table 2
below. These peculiarities suggest that a formal governance framework in each of the islands
is required and that there is a need for an overarching Caribbean response on corporate
governance issues. The recommended Caribbean Corporate Governance Code in 2003, for
example, was an appropriate regional response to be implemented through the Caribbean
Single Market and Economy (CSME), but for various reasons this initiative never materialized
(CTIR, 2005). However, there is a higher probability that individual national codes will be
established instead given the launched of governance codes in Jamaica (2006) and Trinidad
and Tobago (2013).
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Table 1: Governance Peculiarities and Challenges in the Caribbean2
GOVERNANCE
PECULIARITIES
Overreliance on the Same
Pool to Select Directors
(Small Director Pool)
Small Number of Public
Companies

Dominance of Private
Companies
Dominance of Large
Family-Owned Firms
Heavy State Involvement in
Economic Activities
Preference for Commercial
Bank Financing
No Overarching Regional
Regulator(s)
Weak Legislative
Frameworks
Culture of Poor
Enforcement of Laws

GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS / CHALLENGES























Widespread Cross-Directorships
Concept of the Independent Director is difficult to apply
Widespread Conflicts of Interest
Low volume stock markets
Under-resourced SECs (unable to attract and retain highly
skilled persons)
Unsophisticated governance practices
Concentrated number of shareholders
Highly unregulated private sector
Development of Boards and Directors remain limited
Board governance is generally not professionalized
Little strategic changes overtime
Limited number of outside Directors
Higher instances of CEO Duality/Executive Chairpersons
Governance is conformance driven
State-Owned Enterprises with politicized Board Members
Stock Markets unable to grow/expand
No commonality or coordination in time of regional crises
Poor monitoring and enforcement of governance related
requirements
Limitation on power/authority of regulators
Limited enforcement of laws
Loop holes conducive for very risky venture
Limited consequences for non-compliance

In the current context, it is the banking sector that has the highest supervision while other
sectors such as insurance, trust business, credit unions, and pensions are still lagging behind.
This is because commercial banks play a dominant role in the financing of privately-owned
entities. The supervision of banks, however, has been heavily focused on protecting customer
deposits rather than shareholders’ funds or with general matters of corporate governance
(CTIR, 2005). There are nine (9) Central Banks among the fifteen (15) CARICOM member states
with each having its own governance guidelines that have been used to guide the behavior of
banks, insurance and other financially related institutions in their respective jurisdictions.
There are also a number of Security Exchanges across the region − Barbados, Trinidad &
Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana, and the Eastern Caribbean − with clear listing rules and regulations.
These governance guidelines and listing rules have all been heavily influenced by international
developments (CTIR, 2005).
2 Source: Derived from an analysis of data from the Caribbean Trade and Investment Report: Corporate Integration &

Cross-Border Development, 2005 and Report on the Caribbean Corporate Governance Forum, 2003.
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Despite the region’s peculiarities and challenges, good corporate governance will provide the
Caribbean with many benefits that can increase economic stability and sustained
development. These benefits include enhanced self-regulation of companies, positive societal
recognition due to a transparent internal governance structure, and a reduction in the supply
side of corruption (ECCB, 2003).

Methodological Approach
This paper is interested in the causes and consequences of three major cases of financial
collapse in the Caribbean. It is exploratory in nature and aims not only to provide clarity to the
dynamics that existed in these cases but also to propel further research in the area. In this
context, the article seeks to provide in-depth insights as opposed to establish relationships
between variables. A multiple case study approach was therefore adopted to allow an
understanding of complex issues and is considered a robust research method, particularly,
when a holistic, in-depth investigation and explanation of a social phenomenon is required
(Yin, 2013). Data derived from archival records, secondary literature and desktop research have
been employed to examine the three cases. Each element assisted in the corroboration of
information as well as the creation of the case summaries.

Case 1: Trade Confirmers Limited (Barbados)
The first case to be considered is the collapse of Trade Confirmers (Barbados) Limited.
Information for this case was obtained from the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the
Causes of the Collapse of Trade Confirmers (Barbados) Ltd, 1988. Trade Confirmers (Barbados)
Limited (TCBL) was incorporated on March 31, 1982 under the Barbados Companies Act with
an authorized share capital of $5,000,00. Based on the Memorandum of Association, TCBL
offered a variety of financial services. These included carrying on the business of financiers,
discounting trade bills, acting as a confirming house, drawing bills of exchange, granting loans
to individuals and firms, acquiring shares of other companies and guaranteeing the
performance of their contracts, and carrying on the business of insurers. After one year of
operation, TCBL was designated a Financial Institution on April 8, 1983 on recommendation of
the Central Bank of Barbados. This new status allowed the Central Bank to exercise a measure
of control over TCBL by conducting periodic inspections of its books and accounts.
TCBL launched a successful advertising and sales campaign boosted by the promise to pay
above-market interest rates on deposits, particularly, higher than those offered by the
established commercial banks. By the end of August 1983, TCBL had received deposits to the
total of US$2.4M. Almost four (4) years later, TCBL went into receivership on October 9, 1987.
On February 29, 1988, a Commission of Inquiry was appointed to investigate and report on:
1. The causes of the collapse of Trade Confirmers (Barbados) Ltd;
2. Whether the business of Trade Confirmers was carried on negligently or with intent
to defraud depositors or other creditors, and shareholders, or in any way that was
unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregarded, their interests; and
3. To make such recommendations as considered appropriate.
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The Commission found that TCBL was under-capitalized from the beginning of its operations
and in breach of various financial regulations. The Central Bank inspection in May 1984, one
year after becoming a financial institution, revealed that the funding of TCBL was provided by
fixed deposits totaling US$4.3M, share capital amounting to US$973K and Bank barrowings
amounting to US$2.8M. The excess of deposits to share capital was a concern for the
regulators as well as the narrow base of the deposits. Nine (9) customers held deposits of
$100K or more and two (2) had balances of approximately US$800K. This coupled with the fact
that the majority of deposits (83%) were for periods of two years and less made the deposit
base very volatile. Withdrawal of either or both of these deposits could have placed the
institution in a serious liquidity situation.
During this first inspection, it was discovered that loans and advances were at US$8.7M. This
represented a loan-to-deposit ratio of 204% and clearly indicated that TCBL was severely overlent. The inspectors also found that there was a lack of up-to-date financial information on
borrowers and that many of them had poor credit ratings at other financial institutions. TCBL
was also guilty of breaches of the Rate of Interest Act, the Hire Purchase Act, the Exchange
Control Act, and the stipulations in relation to unsecured loans to directors. In fact, two
directors had already obtained advances from the company which were unsecured. In
November 1984, a second inspection was conducted and revealed that very little had changed
in the operations of TCBL. The number of deposits had decreased from 97 to 91 and
borrowings from commercial banks had increased by 37%. In addition, approximately 40% of
the loans portfolio was classified as either “adverse,” “sub-standard,” or “doubtful.”
The incompetence and negligence of the auditors were also prevalent in this case. The Inquiry
found that both the audit senior and the audit partner had no experience in auditing financial
institutions. Audit working papers that were reviewed during the commission showed a
considerable lack of planning and failure to consider issues such as materiality, income
recognition criteria, and loan loss provision.
The negligence, incompetence, and irresponsible attitude of the Board of Directors and
management also significantly contributed to TCBL’s collapse. Although the company was in a
dangerous and risky position, the Board declared and paid a seven percent dividend in 1985
and 1986. The undercapitalization and the difficulty the company was entering with high-risk
customers should have prompted a more prudent and responsible decision. The Commission
of Inquiry eventually concluded that:


The business of TCBL was carried on by the Directors in a manner that unfairly
prejudiced and unfairly disregarded the interest of the depositors, shareholders,
and creditors.



The Directors were negligent in failing to exercise due care and diligence in the
management of the company.



The Chairman and the Managing Director withdrew funds of the company without
the authority of the Board of Directors.



The Managing Director caused fictitious entries to be made in the account books of
the company and that several of these transactions appeared to be fraudulent.
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The auditors failed to adhere to generally-accepted auditing standards in the
acceptance and execution of the audit.



The Central Bank of Barbados failed to exercise its powers under Section 36 of the
Central Bank Act, allowing them to place restrictions on Trade Confirmers.

Although the Commission of Inquiry provided its findings to the Director of Public Prosecutors,
no one has been charged and/or prosecuted to date.

Case 2: The Jamaica Financial Crisis
From the mid-1980s, Jamaica took steps to liberalize its financial sector with a view to creating
an environment conducive to efficient financial intermediation and the strengthening of the
Central Bank’s ability to influence money and credit variables (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002). By
1990, the Central Bank had removed the ceilings placed on banking system credit, and
announced the unification of the cash reserve and liquid assets ratio. Savings rates were also
totally deregulated, enabling commercial banks to set their own rates. In addition, the foreign
exchange system was liberalized and the exchange rate subsequently was determined by
market conditions and the movement of foreign exchange in and out of the country became
unrestricted (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002).
These liberalization policies resulted in significant changes in Jamaica’s financial landscape.
According to Kirkpatrick and Tennant (2002:1935), the financial sector experienced rapid asset
expansion with significant operations among commercial banks and non-bank financial
institutions. The assets of the commercial banks represented 50% of the total assets of the
financial sector by late 1997. The number of non-bank financial institutions also increased from
8 in 1985 to 25 in 1993, with assets increasing in nominal terms from US $0.25B in 1986 to US
0.44B in 1993 (Peart, 1995:15).
In addition to the increased in non-bank financial institutions, there was a significant increase
in the number of large financial conglomerates during this period. These conglomerates,
according to Green (1999:4), were created by insurance companies to exploit the financial
arbitrage provided by the existence of differential cash reserve requirements and differences in
the level of supervision over the various subsectors of the financial system. Typically, these
conglomerates were comprised of a merchant bank, a commercial bank, a building society, an
insurance company, and other firms/subsidiaries. The business models were complex with
inter-company shareholdings, interlocking boards of directors, common management, and
extensive inter-group transactions (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002). These entities expanded
aggressively with innovative financial services and failed to maintain the required prudent
financial practices. However, as a result of the interlocking nature of these conglomerates,
there was a high risk of contagion, which made the entire sector vulnerable to financial
instability. Further, the private sector’s allocation of banking system credit rapidly increased
throughout the period from US$0.53B in 1985 to US$0.84B in 1993 (Kirkpatrick & Tennant,
2002:1936). There was, in fact, an unsustainable credit boom in which loans and investments
were made without proper risk assessment or appropriately valued collateral.
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It was, therefore, not surprising that by the mid-1990s, the initial boom of the financial sector
began to show clear signs of burst. Private sector credit that grew by almost 70% in 1993
drastically declined to 25% in 1996. The profitability of the sector was also on the decline with
a reduction in the return on assets of commercial banks. The banking system’s capital base had
also deteriorated to 3% compared to 8% of the international standard for capital adequacy
(Green, 1999: 21). In addition, most of the insurance companies were plagued by the mismatch
of assets and liabilities. In the early 1990s, the life insurance industry entered into the
aggressive advertising campaigns for short-term and equity-linked products by offering high
rates of return. Imprudent investment of these short-term savings in long-term assets, mainly
real estate, resulted in illiquidity problems for the life insurance industry. The illiquidity
problems in the life insurance industry served as the catalyst for the financial crisis of 1997. The
illiquidity problems in the life insurance industry that was precipitated by the downturn in the
real estate and stock markets rapidly spread to affiliated commercial banks that were
subsequently forced to turn to the Central Bank for liquidity support. In 1995, one commercial
bank received US$0.11B in liquidity support and in 1996 approximately US$0.16B was given to
two other banks. As the problems in the sector worsened, depositors withdrew their savings
from what were perceived to be weak institutions, mainly indigenous with local management,
and deposited these funds with branches of foreign banks (Green, 1999:24). These events
culminated in 6 of the then 9 commercial banks which accounted for 60% of the deposits; 5 life
insurance companies which accounted for 90% of the premium income; one third of all
merchant banks; and several building societies being insolvent. In order to address the
escalating problems within the sector, the government established the Financial Sector
Adjustment Company Limited (FINSAC) in January 1997 to deal with the troubled institutions.
By the end of 1997, the Government of Jamaica assumed control of a number of failed financial
institutions, including CNB, Eagle Commercial Bank, Workers Savings and Loan Bank, Island
Victoria Bank, and Jamaica Citizen Bank (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002; Swaby, 2011)).
The Jamaican crisis was arguably induced by financial liberalization that facilitated the
financial sector’s vulnerability to systemic failure. With the removal of interest rate ceilings and
credit controls, banks were able to finance risker ventures for higher returns, however, this also
increases the probability of the occurrence of agency conflicts which may lead to a lower level
of managerial prudence and hence greater financial fragility (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002). In
the Jamaican case, these tendencies were evident. There was deterioration in the quality of
loan portfolios as well as high levels of non-performing loans. In addition, there were several
instances of financial imprudence due to the following:


Inexperience and inadequate skills for screening and monitoring higher-risk
lending;



Agency conflicts between managers/owners and depositors;



Innovative, but risky attempts to maintain market share;



Related-party transactions; and



Managerial overspending.
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These can be further delineated as follows: (a) the absence of or failure to comply with proper
internal control procedures, (b) poor risk management and inadequate portfolio
diversification; (c) poor quality of management and strategic planning, (d) the failure to
exercise due diligence and care; (e) a high incidence of connected party lending; and (f) breach
of fiduciary duty and fraud (CTIR, 2005).

Case 3: The CLICO/CLF Meltdown (Trinidad &Tobago)
CLICO was the largest insurance company in the Caribbean, the flagship of its parent
company, CL Financial (CLF). In turn, CLF was the largest privately-owned conglomerate in the
Commonwealth Caribbean with operations spanning its core business of insurance, but which
also included financial services, real estate development, manufacturing, agriculture and
forestry, retail and distribution, energy, media, and communications (Browne, 2011). CLF
operated in 32 countries through its associated and joint venture companies, and through
more than 65 subsidiaries spanning the Caribbean, Florida, Europe, the Middle East and Asia.
Until 2009, it controlled assets in excess of TT$100B (Soverall, 2012: 167). CLF also owned 55%
majority ownership of Republic Bank, Trinidad and Tobago’s largest commercial bank, as well
as Methanol Holdings of Trinidad Ltd., which operated M5000, then the world’s largest
methanol plant. It also controlled the British American Insurance Company (BA) which is one of
the main insurance companies in the Eastern Caribbean. In addition, the four largest financial
institutions in CLF managed assets of over TT$38B which constituted approximately 25% of
Trinidad and Tobago’s GDP (Soverall, 2012: 167)).
This impressive business portfolio was unfortunately plagued with a flawed business model.
CLICO was a subsidiary of the parent company, CL Financial. However, CLICO functioned as
the primary source of deposits that were used to finance CLF’s expansion through investments
and acquisitions held in the name of other entities in the group (Soverall, 2012). The nature of
the ownership structure of these enterprises significantly varied. Some were wholly-owned
and managed by CLF, others were simply investments that CLF did not participate in
managing, and some were a mixture of both. In some cases, CLF borrowed from other
subsidiary financial institutions to invest, and in most cases it used CLICO, Clico Investment
Bank Limited (CIB), British American Insurance Company (BA), or Caribbean Money Market
Brokers (CMMB) as the conduit to purchase investments or borrowed from them to do so. In
short, CLICO became the guarantor for many of CLF’s assets most of which were heavily
pledged and, therefore, limited in terms of the potential proceeds from asset sales.
By operating with such a model, the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT) alleged that
CLICO operated both an external Ponzi scheme in which the insurance company took in new
money from policyholders and mutual fund investors, as well as an internal Ponzi scheme in
which money was diverted or misappropriated away from CLICO to fund CIB, CLF, and other
group entities with little or no prospect of return (Henry, 2009). In other words, CLICO took
large numbers of deposits on a short-term basis paying high interest rates and used them for
long-term investments which resulted in significant cash flow problems that precipitated its
ultimate collapse.
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However, the warnings of this collapse emerged years before. A 1998 Report of the Office of
the Supervisor of Insurances had raised the red flags of the affairs of CLICO. The Report
indicated that CLICO had failed to satisfy its statutory fund, a basic safeguard used to ensure
the soundness of insurance companies. The fund recorded a TT$62.4M deficit in 1992, a $1.3M
deficit in 1993, a $64.7M deficit in 1995, a $574.1M deficit in 1996, and a $690M in 1997 (Bagoo,
2010). The 1998 Report stated that CLICO was “technically insolvent,” broke the law by paying
dividends when its statutory fund was in deficit, apparently understated liabilities through the
failure to submit acceptable actuarial certificates, and was using policyholders’ funds to offer
guarantees to affiliates. The report further revealed that the lag in the company’s efforts to
satisfy the statutory fund became a perennial problem. CLICO had also requested the Office of
the Supervisor of Insurances to approve a debenture for TT$571M from CLF. The Office
however refused noting the company’s low returns and the lack of free assets to support the
debenture as well as the company defaulting in 1996/1997 on payment of $4M on an existing
debenture issued to CLICO in 1992. The 1992 debenture was a result of CLICO’s loan to CLF
which increased from $350M in 1995 to $571M in 1996 (Bagoo, 2010). The Supervisor of
Insurances therefore questioned the ability of CLICO to pay an additional sum of $158M per
annum plus interest on this new debenture. The Report stated that it was disturbing that
CLICO had continued to use policyholders’ funds to make unsecured loans to its parent
company (CFL) that was heavily leveraged and with little capital reserves. Despite this report,
and therefore the Central Bank’s awareness, no steps were taken to address these glaring
breaches.
There are always underlying vulnerabilities in the origin of a crisis which may include a
combination of factors ranging from poor-risk management, mismatches between assets and
liabilities, excessive leveraging of available capital, poor liquidity management, inadequate
capital (whether or not capital grows insufficiently as the institution’s liabilities expand), hubris
among management, and outright fraud. In the case of CLICO/CLF, there were: a mismatch
between assets and liabilities, excessive leveraging of balance sheet assets, a preponderance
of intragroup transactions, an absence of an effective risk management framework, and plain
capital inadequacy (Soverall & Persaud, 2013). These, in turn, were compounded by a weak
legislative and regulatory infrastructure in which CLF − the holding company − was not
subjected to adequate formal regulatory oversight and practiced poor internal governance
when it did pay attention to such detail (Soverall & Persaud, 2013). These five factors are also
related to a lack of good governance practices among the boards of directors, executives,
external auditors, and regulators of CLICO/CFL. The consequences of years of persistent bad
management and governance within CLICO/CLF together with inaction by regulators were
eventually manifested in 2009. The global financial crisis of 2008 was simply the catalyst for
the inevitable meltdown of CLICO/CLF.
The collapse of CLICO/CLF forced the intervention of the Government of the Republic Trinidad
and Tobago (GORTT) because the financial condition of CLICO, CLICO Investment Bank (CIB),
and British American Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited (BA), subsidiaries of the parent
company, CL Financial, threatened the interest of depositors, policyholders, and creditors of
these institutions and posed danger of disruption or damage to the financial system of Trinidad
and Tobago (GORTT, 2009). This intervention was formalized through a Memorandum of
11

Understanding (MOU) between the GORTT and CLF dated January 30, 2009. The overarching
aim of the MOU was to protect the interest of depositors, policyholders, and creditors of these
institutions as well as to correct the financial problems of CLICO, CIB, and BA.
In a move towards correcting the financial condition of these companies, CLF agreed to sell all
its shareholdings in Republic Bank Limited (RBL), Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited
(MHTL), and Caribbean Money Market Brokers Limited (CMMB). CLF also agreed to the selling
of all or any of its other assets as may be required to achieve the said correction (MOU, 2009).
In addition, the proceeds of the sale of assets would be applied to satisfy the statutory fund
requirements for CLICO and BA under the Insurance Act of 1980 and the balancing of the thirdparty assets and liabilities portfolio of CIB. However, in the event that there was a shortfall
after the application of the proceeds realized from the sale of the assets, CLF warranted to
provide collateral which could include a secured charge on the fixed and floating assets of CLF,
CLICO, and BA; this amount was to be sufficient to secure any financial assistance to be
provided by GORTT in respect of that shortfall for the purpose of maintaining public
confidence and stability in the financial system (GORTT, 2009). Moreover, according to the
MOU, CLF agreed that “CLICO and BA will restructure its business and operations to conform
to traditional life insurance business lines in a manner approved” by the Central Bank of T&T,
including “a reconstitution of the Board of Directors, Board Committees and senior
management” whose selection were to be approved by the government (GORTT, 2009:4). The
corrective measures also included the need for CLICO/CLF to fundamentally change and adopt
a more robust and less risky business model, and to change its corporate governance structure
(Williams, 2009).
From the Commission of Enquiry into the failure of CLICO, it was further revealed that the
Central Bank had a number of concerns about the quality of CLICO’s corporate governance,
specifically the infrequency with which the CLICO Board met and the limited number of
independent directors on its board (Commission of Enquiry, 2012). The board seemed to be
simply a rubber-stamp of decisions made by the Executive Chairman. Furthermore, CLICO
operated without an Audit Committee or Risk Committee as well as without an Investment
Committee (Commission of Enquiry, 2012). Therefore, there was poor monitoring of decisions,
risks, and investments. Moreover, conflicts of interest were prevalent.

Discussion
These three cases underscore the importance of internal and external governance practices in
the financial sector. Internally, it is evident that the role of management and the core
principles of management, and the management of risk were inadequately exercised in these
cases. Prudent leadership from the boards of directors would have ensured better monitoring
of management’s behavior as well as adequate risk management which would, in turn, have
protected the interests of depositors, shareholders, and other stakeholders. The directors,
however, failed in their fiduciary duties and neglected to fulfill their roles with the duty of care
and skills required. Therefore, whilst corporate governance frameworks existed from a
statutory standpoint, in practice, compliance with these was highly unobserved. Further, both
management and boards of directors in these cases may not have possessed the required
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competency to govern their respective institutions within the complexities of the ever-evolving
innovative financial activities.
Externally, there were a number of key regulatory gaps. Regulators failed to properly supervise
and take appropriate actions in each of the cases examined. This might be a result of a
combination of factors such as incompetence, lack of resources, and political interference.
Without robust supervision and timely actions, the vulnerabilities increased overtime leading
to these crises. Arguably, the smooth functioning of financial institutions will always depend
on the quality of oversight by regulatory bodies. In addition, the legislative framework in the
jurisdictions in which these cases occurred did not only failed, in certain aspects, to provide
regulators with the level of supervisory authority needed but also lagged in comparison to the
rapidly evolving operations and complexities of financial institutions. The regulatory gaps
together with the deficiencies among the various boards, management teams, and auditors
clearly demonstrate the importance of good corporate governance practices for firm
performance and sustainability.

COMMON GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS

Table 2: Common Governance Problems in the Three Cases
TRADE
CONFIRMERS

JAMAICA’S
CRISIS

CLICO/
CFL

Ineffective Regulatory Oversight
& Auditors

✓

✓

✓

Weak Legislative Frameworks

✓

✓

✓

Negligent Boards

✓

✓

✓

Interlocking Boards

✗

✓

✓

Absence of Independent Directors

✓

✓

✓

Excessive Intergroup Transactions

✗

✓

✓

Conflicts of Interest

✓

✓

✓

Poor Risk Management

✓

✓

✓

Mismatches between Assets &
Liabilities

✓

✓

✓

Inept Senior Management

✓

✓

✓

From a theoretical perspective, the agency theory offers valuable insights to understanding
the behavior of managers and directors in these cases. The “model of man” underlying the
agency theory is that of the self-interested and opportunistic agent rationally maximizing
his/her own personal economic gain. The model is individualistic and is predicated upon the
notion of an in-built conflict of interest between owner/principal and manager/agent.
Moreover, the model is one of an individual calculating likely costs and benefits, and thus
seeking to attain rewards and avoid punishment, especially financial ones (Donaldson & Davis,
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1991). Based on this premise, agents may commit “moral hazards” merely to enhance their
own wealth at the cost of their principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Assuming that the
principal and the agent are mainly concerned about maximizing their personal wealth, agency
theory argues that the agent may not always act in the best interests of the principal as evident
in the decisions and actions of management in three cases examined. Examples include the
managers in Trade Confirmers who defrauded depositors, creditors, and other shareholders; or
in the case where the financial institutions in Jamaica engaged in significantly increased risktaking, leading to the deterioration in the quality of loan portfolios and revealing a divergence
of interests between managers/owners and depositors; or with the CLICO/CFL in terms of
management using policyholders’ deposits and investing in exceedingly high levels of
vulnerable ventures, ultimately exposing these depositors to unprecedented risks/losses. A
major structural mechanism to curtail such managerial “opportunism” is the board of directors.
This body provides a monitoring of managerial actions on behalf of shareholders. Such
impartial review will occur more fully where the chairperson of the board is independent of
executive management. Where the chief executive officer is chair of the board of directors, the
impartiality of the board is compromised. However, in each of the cases examined, it is evident
that the board of directors did not provide impartial oversight of management and thus failed
to represent and protect the interests of principals. In short, in each of the cases the agents
committed “moral hazards” as argued in the agency theory.
Historically, the region’s pursuit of good corporate governance has been generally slow with
limited pressure from government, the media, civil society, or even the professional and
academic communities. Prior to the CLICO/CLF meltdown, the region had not experienced any
corporate failures that had region-wide consequences as demonstrated in the cases examined.
Thus it was reasonable to expect that in the years following the CLICO/CFL meltdown, there
would have been pressure from various constituents for game-changing corporate governance
reforms across the region. However, this has been relatively limited. The CLICO/CFL
meltdown finally prompted calls by Caribbean leaders for greater regional cooperation on
matters of regulation and supervision of such firms. CARICOM leaders recognized the need to
not only effect appropriate reform in financial sector policy, but also the need to enhance
national regulatory and supervisory systems, including rationalization and consolidation of
these systems across the region for ensuring safety, soundness, and stability in the financial
services sector (CTIR, 2010). Furthermore, in recognizing that there is significant financial
integration across the region based on both organic growth and mergers and acquisitions,
cross-border supervision − according to these leaders − needs to be critically enhanced by the
regional regulatory organizations: the Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG), the
Caribbean Association of Insurance Regulators (CAIR), the Caribbean Group of Securities
Regulators (CGSR), and the Regional Competition Commission (CTIR, 2010).
Although enhancing the regulatory and supervisory systems will aid in improving the quality of
governance practices, there are doubts concerning the extent to which a positive behavioral
change would occur among managers and directors. This is based on the observation that
where stiffer governance regulations or laws and penalties have been enacted, a decline in
corporate scandals did not necessarily occur. For instance, following the series of major
corporate and accounting scandals affecting Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine
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Systems, and WorldCom in the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was
passed. This act established new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards,
and management and public accounting firms. As a result of SOX, top management must
individually certify the accuracy of financial information. In addition, penalties for fraudulent
financial activity became much more severe. SOX increased requirements for the
independence of outside auditors who review the accuracy of corporate financial statements,
and increased the oversight role of boards of directors (Kimmel, Weygandt, & Kieso, 2011).
Yet it was primarily irresponsible governance and leadership which caused the 2008 global
economic crisis. This underscores the inherent limitations of regulatory and compliance driven
measures, and forces us to consider other strategies to achieve effective governance and
leadership (Pless & Maak, 2011). SOX has neither prevented frauds nor instituted fairness, but
it has created the perception that stricter governance laws were needed to safeguard
investors. As a result, SOX-type regulations were subsequently enacted in other countries such
as Canada (2002), Germany (2002), South Africa (2002), France (2003), Australia (2004), India
(2005), Japan (2006), and Italy (2006). Nonetheless, it is still highly contentious whether a
fundamental change in the attitude and behavior of boards and executives has not occurred.
This suggests that strategies aimed at improving governance must give closer attention to the
ethical dimensions of good governance.
It is based on this perspective that a compliance-regulatory focus needs to be significantly
complemented with the building of a practice of Responsible Leadership (RL). RL represents a
concept that bridges the fields of social responsibility and leadership and can be appropriately
applied in the study and practice of corporate governance. Although the definition of RL is
evolving, it can be considered as intentional actions taken by leaders to benefit the
stakeholders of the company/and or actions taken to avoid harmful consequences for
corporate stakeholders and the larger society (Stahl & Sully de Luque, 2014:238). RL crosses
levels of analysis by considering individuals, groups, and organizations as a whole and
compared to related forms of leadership such as ethical or values-based, RL has a unique
applicability to the upper levels of organizations (Waldman & Balven 2014). This includes
executives, and certainly the board of directors, who are charged with directing and controlling
the decisions and behavior of the organization. Therefore, at the core of RL is the focus on how
individual perceptions, decisions, and actions, particularly those at senior levels, impact on the
social and financial performance of their organizations (Stahl & Sully de Luque, 2014).
Responsibility is one of the core pillars of corporate governance and requires that directors
carry out their duties with honesty, probity, and integrity (GCGF, 2008) while recognizing the
rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements. This encourages
cooperation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the
sustainability of financially sound enterprises (OECD, 2004). This core pillar has been given
limited attention in the attempts to improve corporate governance in the region. RL not only
addresses corporate scandals, but it extends in scope to consider the changes in and new
demands of business contexts (Waldman & Galvin, 2008). RL therefore takes a stakeholder
approach to governance whereby the importance of ethics and social responsibility to
organizational effectiveness through engagement of diverse stakeholder groups accentuates
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the duties of businesses and boards of directors beyond profitability and shareholder returns
(Singhapakdi, Vitell, Rallapalli, & Kraft, 1996) This is in contrast to the still dominant, limited
economic view that a business’s sole responsibility is to maximize profitability and returns to
shareholders. While companies use the stakeholder language, their actions reflect the
dominance of shareholder primacy in a rapidly changing world where sustainability is
paramount.
Pless and Maak (2011) maintained that RL and stakeholder approaches are not just inextricably
linked, but RL provides a convincing perspective on how to connect leadership to stakeholder
engagement. By making leader-stakeholder relationships the center of attention, RL focuses
on the responsibilities that leaders have in relation to different stakeholder groups
(shareholders, investors, regulators, customers, employees, communities, environment etc.).
With this general demand for corporate sector involvement in socio-economic solutions, firms
need leaders who embrace a system of decision-making that enables them to assess decisions
in relation to relevant stakeholders. This approach should become integral to the culture and
moral fiber of the organization and uniformly applied across its operations. It also suggests
that even board governance has to be approached in this manner to create a RL approach to
business.
Stakeholders demand that businesses and their leaders take active roles in fostering
responsible behavior, internally and externally to the organization, such as creating
responsible organizational cultures, pursuing sustainability, and acting like good corporate
citizens (Maak, 2007). The scope of RL is directly linked to the increasing attention by various
stakeholders to the role and responsibility of business leaders in the pursuit of a global
common good. In this context, the scope of good corporate governance changes. Neither
boards of directors, management, or regulators should focus only on shareholder interests
because society now demands that the interests of all key stakeholders be considered in a
balanced manner. Profit remains critical, but the way in which it is derived becomes the key
challenge with the new demands of and changes in business contexts. An RL approach is
integral to responding to these contexts.
This article provided insights into the state of corporate governance in the Caribbean by
examining three major governance failures experienced in the region and proposes a
responsible leadership approach to corporate governance because it is much more relevant to
the changing business contexts of the region. Further research is certainly required, but the
paper creates a framework to continue the discourse on Caribbean corporate governance.
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